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sectoral effects are bound to originate from the agriculture which 
accounts 11.4 % of Turkey’s GDP.  
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1.1 Preliminaries: Turkey’s integration with the EU 
 
Turkey’s integration with the European Community has a long history. It applied for associate 
membership already in 1959, just two years after the establishment of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The application resulted in an association agreement (Ankara agreement) four 
years later in 1963. Already this agreement had an intermediate goal to gradually form a customs 
union with the EEC by 1995. Customs union was seen as a step to a full membership as the ultimate 
goal. No timetable was, however, set to full membership. 
 
In practise, Turkey pursued very inward-oriented development strategies and trade policy during the 
1960s and 1970s. Only in the 1980s the Turkish economy started to open up. The shift to more 
outward-oriented strategy led finally to an application for EU membership in 1989. 
 
In 1996, Turkey and the EU agreed that Turkey will join the EU’s customs union. The agreement 
covers industrial products and processed agricultural goods. Turkey adopted the EU’s common 
external tariff (CET), resulting in lower duties for imports from third countries, including the United 
States. The union establishes zero duty rates and no quotas for non-agricultural items of EU and 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) origin. The current import regime is organized in five 
chapters that list more than 20,000 items, identified with 12 digit harmonized tariff system numbers. 
Turkey also adopted most of the preferential trade agreements concluded by the EU, as well as 
other measures covered by the EU’s external trade policy. Turkey did not, however, obtain any 
influence of EU’s external trade policy – it only started to follow the EU’s commercial policy. 
Moreover, agriculture was excluded and it is still heavily protected by both the EU and Turkey. 
 
Turkey started its membership negotiations with the EU in October 2005 after a 16 years delay after 
its application. On Turkish side the public opinion on membership is positive. According to the 
most recent Eurobarometer survey 54 per cent of Turks are in favour of membership and only 20 
per cent against. The share of Turks who do not favour nor oppose Turkish membership has 
increased during the negotiations. In general, the survey results demonstrate that economic 
prosperity, social protection and freedom to travel, study and work in other EU countries are seen as 
the main benefits whereas less use of own language, loss of  national identity and organised crime 
are placed as the main fears. All in all the results suggest that Turks think that they will benefit from 
membership, in particular, economically. 
 
On the EU side the opinion is not at all as positive. Only 39 per cent of EU citizens are in favour of 
Turkish membership. Moreover, among the potential new member states Turkey is seen as least 
popular. The public opinion towards Turkish membership is most critical in Austria, Germany and 
Luxembourg. This suggests that membership negotiations will last long and, indeed, they have 
made only a little progress so far. 
 
Thus a number of Europeans seem reluctant to accept Turkey as a member of the. One reason may 
be that culture of the Turkish society is seen ‘non-European’ reflecting the fact that Islam is the 
main religion and that Turkey is largely an Asian rather than a European country. Another reason 
why EU members may be reluctant about the Turkish accession may originate from its size. 
Population forecasts indicate that the Turkish population will exceed that of Germany by 2020,   2
which would mean that Turkey would be the biggest country in the EU and hence it would obtain 
substantial power in EU decision making. 
 
 
1.2 Earlier studies on Turkey’s EU membership 
 
Despite the sluggish progress in membership negotiations it is important to evaluate the effects of 
Turkish membership from several perspectives. In this paper, we concentrate on the economic 
effects of Turkish EU membership using a computable general equilibrium model. There are several 
earlier studies on Turkish EU integration using similar methodology. Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr 
(1997) estimated that gain from adopting the EU’s common external tariff (CET) amount 1.1 
percent of Turkish GDP. As an implication Francois (2005) argues that the trade effects of EU 
membership will be very small due to the existing CU between the EU and Turkey. The same 
reason leads him to conclude that in terms of regulatory stance Turkey has developed towards the 
EU regime. Agriculture is not, however, a part of the CU and therefore the most substantial trade 
effects of Turkey’s membership are expected concern agriculture. 
 
Lejour and de Mooij (2005) focus on three following main changes associated with Turkish  
membership: accession to the internal European Market, institutional reforms in Turkey triggered  
by EU-membership and migration in response to the free movement of workers. 
 
 
The authors utilise gravity estimation to derive the potential trade between the EU and Turkey. By 
comparing this potential trade with actual trade, they estimate the tariff equivalent of the remaining 
trade barriers between Turkey and the EU. These barriers were then removed to simulate the 
accession of Turkey to the EU internal market, thereby using a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for the world economy that is calibrated on data for 2001. The acquis communautaire 
could act as a catalyst for improving institutions in Turkey. Many institutional indicators show that 
these institutions are less market oriented in Turkey than in the EU member states or the other 
accession countries. The authors investigate to what extent a reform of these institutions could 
benefit the Turkish economy by improving its competitive position. This was done by deriving the 
potential trade between Turkey and other countries if the institutions would be improved. They then 
simulated the macroeconomic effects of this trade increase with CGE model. Thirdly, the authors 
elaborated on the potential migration flows following the accession of Turkey to the EU. They 
explored the implications for labour markets with their CGE model. 
 
The main findings of Lejour and de Mooij study are three-fold. First, the economic effects are 
asymmetric. The accession to the internal market yields positive effects for Turkey: private income 
(a measure for welfare) increases by 4.4 billion US$ (approximately € 3.5 billion, assuming 1€ = 
1.25US$), while GDP expands by about 0.8% in the long term. Incumbent EU countries benefit 
from the accession of Turkey to the EU, albeit only marginally. This is a typical finding in studies 
concerning EU enlargements where a relatively small country or groups of countries assumed to 
join. The result is simply due to the fact that the EU is in relative terms much more important 
trading partner than Turkey is from the viewpoint of the EU. Second, membership in the Internal 
Market is likely to improvement national institutions in Turkey and this would bring large effects 
relative to the direct impact of the accession to the Internal Market. Turkish GDP would increase 
according to Lejour and Mooij estimate by 5.6% due more working institutions. Third, migration 
involves a potentially important effect in light of the accession of Turkey to the EU. An expected 
inflow of 2.7 million Turks to the current EU, mainly to Germany, would reduce GDP in Turkey by 
between 1.8% and 2.2%, and increase it in the EU-15 by between 0.5% and 0.7%, depending on the   3
skill composition of the migrants. Flam (2005) estimates that the number of Turks in Germany will 
reach 3.5 million from the current 2.2 million. Drawing on earlier empirical and theoretical 
literature, he argues that wages of skilled workers might increase in the current EU countries if the 
immigrants are complements to local skilled labour. Wages of unskilled labour is, in turn, are likely 
to decrease. 
 
Francois (2005) explores both quantitative and qualitative implications of Turkish accession to the 
EU for the transport sector. The paper executed an application of numerical estimates of the 
economy-wide and sector impact of accession (given the pre-existence of a customs union) on the 
sector. Also a factor analysis of regulatory regimes was performed.  
 
The customs union, as currently constructed, yielded a boost in Turkish welfare (measured as a % 
of base national income) of over 1.3 % relative to baseline with MFN industrial tariffs. Based on 
1997 values, this was comparable to a boost in real GDP of $2.2 billion. The static effect is slight, 
adding less than 0.1 % to welfare through induced capital accumulation. Both skilled and unskilled 
workers gained from the agreement, with a 2.2 % and 1.7 % boost to real incomes (net of changes 
in the CPI) over the long-run. Such wage changes were considerable, given that they were realised 
in the context of a trade agreement. 
 
In their recent study, Togan and Hoekman (2005) argue that the main economic dimensions of 
Turkish membership are the availability of the EU model, free labour mobility, assistance from the 
EU budget and EU institutions. Contrasting to other studies they argue that the first effect seems 
gradually been achieved through the CU with the EU. Agriculture, which has an important role in 
Turkish economy, is however excluded from the CU. De-regulation is another additional issue that 
is not directly implied by the CU but is an essential part of the Internal Market. Togan (2005) 
estimates that the economic gain from EU membership for Turkey will be 3.6 per cent of Turkish 
real household income and 2.6 percent increase in GDP. The major impact on welfare comes from 
deregulation of banking, transportation, telecommunications and electricity sector. The total income 
effect is slightly smaller than in Lejour and Mooij (2005) but the output effect is slightly bigger. In 
this paper, we also deal indirectly with regulation by using a simulation model that assumes 
imperfect competition. We also put emphasis on sectoral and geographical results. 
 
2 The Turkish economy 
 
The per capita GDP for the year 2003 (PPP) is almost 6,400 dollars, significantly lower than the 
average of the EU. The main contribution to the Turkish GDP comes from the services sector 
(60%). Other sources are industry (28%) and agriculture (12%).Tourism is the leading branch in the 
services sector. In 2000, the number of tourists reached 10.2 million while the forecast is that by the 
year 2020 the number of tourists visiting Turkey each year will reach some 40 million.   
Approximately 33%  of the Turkish work force is employed in agriculture. 
 
The Turkish economy possesses a number of advantages, including a very young population, very 
low labour costs (some 25% of the labour costs that are the norm in Germany), a proficient labour 
force and a central and convenient location between Western Europe, Asia and the countries of the 
Middle East. 
 
In 2003, exports from Turkey amounted to some 47 billion dollars. In the same year, imports into 
Turkey amounted to some 68 billion dollars. The main export components are the textile industry, 
followed by the automobile industry and food. The main import components are machinery and   4
equipment and the import of types of fuel. Turkey's main trading partners are the countries of the 
EU. In 2003, main exports were to Germany (16%), the U.S. (8%) and the U.K. (8%). 
 
In 2003, most imports, were from the EU countries, mainly Germany (13.7%) and Italy (7.9%). 
The Turkish economy benefits from a Customs Union agreement that was signed in 1996 with the 
EU. The agreement increases profitability of trade with the EU countries. The main natural 
resources in Turkey are the Chromites copper mines, sulfur and coal. Turkey is also very rich in 
water resources that it is attempting to export to other countries. The Turkish economy benefits 
from membership of a number of international organizations, including, among others - NATO, 
OECD and IMF. 
 
Analysis of the main indices in Turkey shows a high rate of inflation in Turkey compared to the 
EU. Despite the recent decrease in inflation, the 2003 annual rate of inflation is still around 25% per 
annum. The forecast for 2004 is around 11%. The GDP in 2002-2003 shows a recovery. The 
unemployment rate in 2003 is around 10%. 
 
The Government of Turkey estimates that as a result of its accession to the European Customs 
Union, the average duty rate for imports from the European Union and EFTA countries has dropped 
from approximately ten percent to zero. For products imported from third countries, including the 
United States, the average duty rate has dropped from ten percent to approximately five percent. 
Turkey has reserved some exempted categories for sensitive products with tariffs on these items 
generally much higher than the CCT. Some agricultural goods will remain protected by steep tariffs 
until the next WTO round is concluded. When the European Union applies further Uruguay Round 
reductions, Turkey's average rates for third countries (including the U.S.) will be lowered to 3.5 
percent. 
 
Turkey is a member of GATT/WTO and regulates its customs practices in line with GATT 
requirements. In 1989, Turkey, along with the United States, converted to the new GATT 
Harmonized System. While generally in compliance with the WTO agreement, Turkey has 
exceeded its annual export subsidy limits for sugar and wheat in the past. In the current year, 
Turkey has exceeded its limits for barley. Turkey regularly fails to notify the WTO of changes to 
import requirements. Application of non-tariff barriers also poses problems for agricultural products 
such as wheat and bananas. Maintenance of high import duties on agricultural products, while 
consistent with WTO obligations, is not consistent with the spirit of the WTO agreement. Turkey’s 
failure to establish protocols for the importation of all meat products (except for breeding cattle-
beef and dairy), effectively banning all imports is in violation of WTO obligations. 
 
Import duties are calculated on the CIF value. Turkey is a signatory to Article VII of the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The agreement stipulates that the customs valuation is 
the transaction value (the price that is actually paid or payable plus costs and expenses). Turkey is 
also obliged to comply with other Article VII provisions including the rapidity of clearance of 
goods, currency convertibility, and appeal privileges and rights. Turkish regulations do not allow 
for advance rulings on customs HS classification or on the applicable import duties on particular 
products. 
 
Customs surcharges including a value-added tax (VAT) being levied on most imported, as well as 
domestic, goods and services. The importer is responsible for paying the VAT. The VAT is 
calculated on a C.I.F. basis plus duty rate and any other applicable charges levied before the goods 
clear customs. It has a ceiling of 26 percent; however; most industrial products are charged a rate of   5
18 percent. Capital goods, some raw materials, imports by government agencies and state owned 
enterprises, and products for investments with incentive certificates are exempt from import fees. 
 
3 GTAP model  
 
The Global Trade Analysis Project1 (GTAP) is a multi-region, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model. The inter-regional linkages originate from bilateral trade flows, while intra-industry 
linkages are captured by the regional input-output structure. The associated GTAP database covers 
bilateral trade data, structure of production, consumption and intermediate use of commodities and 
services. The latest version of the database, GTAP 6 Beta, includes 78 different regions
2 and 57 
different sectors of production.  
 
Macroeconomic data (GDP, private consumption, government consumption, and investment) are 
used in updating the input-output tables to a common reference year – 2001. The primary source of 
2001 macroeconomic data used in the GTAP 6 Data Base is the World Bank. 
 
Reconciled bilateral 2001 merchandise trade data is based on COMTRADE data. Services trade 
data was updated to 2001 using the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.  
 
GTAP model computes money metric equivalent of aggregate per capita utility for a region (using 
the regional household’s utility function). The regional household’s Equivalent Variation (EV) 
which is the difference between the expenditure required to obtain the new, post-simulation level of 
utility at initial prices.  
 
The standard GTAP-model is a multi-region, applied general equilibrium model, with perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale. Imports are differentiated by their source from domestic 
goods, that is, the Armington assumption is made on bilateral trade. The standard model has some 
salient features that distinguish it from other CGE models: a presentation of private household 
preferences with a non-homothetic constant-difference-of-elasticity (CDE) functional form, an 
explicit treatment of international trade and transport margins, and a global banking sector which 
intermediates between global savings and consumption.  
 
Each industry is represented by a single homogeneous commodity. The basic model includes three 
factors of production: labour, capital, and land. Labour and capital are mobile across domestic 
sectors, while land is assumed to be used only in agricultural sectors. Capital is traded 
internationally like intermediate inputs, while labour and land are not mobile across borders. 
 
The model gives users a wide range of closure options (choosing which variables are exogenous), 
including a selection of partial equilibrium closures which facilitate comparison of results to studies 






                                                 
1 See (http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu)
2 Of which 56 are primary regions and 10 composite regions.   6
3.1. Regional Household 
 
In each region, there is a regional household whose Cobb-Douglas preferences are defined over 
composite private expenditures, composite public sector expenditures and savings. The regional 
household derives income from ownership and sales of primary factors of production - capital, 
skilled and unskilled labour, land and natural resources. It turns out that the inter-temporal, 
extended linear expenditure system could be derived from an equivalent, static maximization 
problem, in which savings enters the utility function (Howe 1975). This result provides a 
justification for the inclusion of savings in the regional utility function.  
 
Private expenditures are governed by a Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDE) function which was 
first proposed by Hanoch (1975). The CDE function has the desirable property that the resulting 
preferences are non-homothetic and is more parsimonious in its parameter requirements than 
functional flexible forms. It can also be shown that the CES and the Cobb-Douglas are special cases 
of the CDE function. Government expenditures are governed by a Cobb-Douglas preference 
function. Finally, there is inter-industry demand whose technical specifications are described by the 




Production is presented by a multi-level production function. The upper nest is a Leontief 
production function involving value added and intermediate inputs. Value added is produced 
through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function of the three primary factors of 
production. Each intermediate input is in turn produced using domestic and imported components 
(the Armington assumption) with the technical process described by a CES function. Finally, 
imported components are a mix of imports from the other regions in the global model with the 
technical process again described by a CES function. 
 
Households own all factor supplies - land, natural resources, capital, skilled and unskilled labour 
and sell their services to firms. In the GTAP model, sluggishness of some factors is allowed so that 
it is possible for factor prices not to be equalized within a region. Firms are supposed to sell output 
and purchase inputs (whether primary factors or intermediates) in competitive markets. Hence, 
firms make no economic profits. 
 
Labour and capital are mobile across domestic sectors, while land is assumed to be used only in 
agricultural sectors. Capital is traded internationally like intermediate inputs, while labour and land 
are not mobile across borders. 
 
The GTAP model allows for factor taxes, production and consumption taxes, export taxes and 
import tariffs which are in turn distinguished by production sector, by agent (regional household, 
firm, government) and by region.  
 
3.3 Savings and Investment 
 
Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption about preferences of the regional household, savings are a 
constant proportion of regional household income. The pool of savings is what becomes available 
for investments. There is a capital goods sector in each region, which produces the investment 
goods. The rate of return on capital goods is assumed to be inversely related to the stock of capital.   7
The allocation of investment across regions and sectors is done in such a way that expected regional 
rates of return change by the same percentage. In the model, the pooling of savings and the global 
allocation of investment are costless.  
 
The GTAP model does not contain a financial sector. An investment is therefore represented by a 
unique investment good that is not form-specific, sector-specific, or region-specific. As such, the 
model framework has a limitation in the flow analysis of FDI. The model is strongly relevant, 
though, to general equilibrium analyses of an FDI-related increase in a region’s capital stock, and of 
a technology spill-over. 
 
 
3.4 Macro Framework 
 
In the GTAP model, private households and government are treated as a single decision-making 
economic agent called the regional household. Private households supply productive factors (land, 
labour, and capital) to producers, and obtain factor income in return. Government revenues come 
from household income taxes, producers’ taxes, and taxes on international transactions (minus 
subsidies if they exist). Regional income is defined as the sum of private households’ factor income 
and government revenues minus capital stock depreciation. Regional income in excess of regional 
expenditures is saved and used as investments by producers. Two global sectors complete the 
system. The global transportation sector provides services that account for the difference between 
FOB and CIF values for a particular commodity shipped along a specific route. The global banking 
sector is designed in such a way as to secure the global savings-investment consistency.  
 
3.5 Imperfect competition 
 
The standard GTAP model assumes perfectly competitive markets and hence marginal cost pricing 
rule. Francois (1998) formulated an imperfect competition module that can be added to the standard 
GTAP model. The imperfect competition module
3 includes several types of oligopoly models: 
increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and free entry and exit assumptions. The 
models are documented in Francois (1998).  
 
For this study we considered the effect of scale economies. For these we needed information on cost 
disadvantage ratios defined as CDR=(AC-MC)/AC. 
  
Martins et. al (1996) estimate sector specific P/MC margins for OECD countries. The link between 
cost disadvantage ratio and price cost margins comes from   
 
CDR=(AC-MC)/AC = (P-MC)/P=1-(MC/P) under P=AC pricing. 
 
In the model, falling average costs are captured via variable ao, which is output augmenting 
technical change. For imperfectly competitive sectors this is determined endogenously via 
following equation. 
 
                                                 
3 see also http://130.94.208.165/francois/data.htm   8






where CDR denotes the scale-economies parameter defined above, qva is percentage change in real 
value-added demanded by the sector. FIRMS is a variable denoting entry to the market (assumed 
here exogenous). According to the above equation, ao rises, or equivalently average costs fall as the 
quantity of value-added per firm rises. The rate at which this fall in average costs takes place when 




In Armington models, goods are differentiated by country of origin, and the similarity of goods 
from different regions is measured by the elasticity of substitution. Within a particular region, we 
assume that demand goods from different regions are aggregated into a composite good according 
to the CES function.  
 
 




















The imperfect competition module assumes a non-nested Armington structure, that is ESUBD, the 
Armington CES elasticity for domestic/imported allocation equals ESUBM, the Armington CES 







In the following, we assess the economic effects of Turkish EU membership. To carry out the 
investigation we run the following simulations.  
 
1.  Competition standard – this corresponds to standard GTAP model with import sourcing.  
2.  Scale with no entry – this corresponds to the existence of scale economies (as quantified by 
the cost disadvantage ratios defined as CDR = (AC-MC)/AC.  
3.  Scale with entry – is the same as above, but with zero profit (p=ac) assumption 
   9
The first scenario is applies the standard perfect competition version of the GTAP model and it 
serves as a benchmark. The two other scenarios assume economies of scale  
 
 





























































































Note: Using the fact that CDR=(AC-MC)/AC = (P-MC)/P=1-(MC/P) under P=AC pricing, the above estimates for the 
scale economies parameter were used. 
 
 
Togan (2005) considers only some industries with a different methodology. He ends up with 26 per 
cent price decline in banking, 33 per cent in telecommunications, 9 per cent in transport and 21 per 
cent in electricity. Using these we end up with almost exactly the same scale parameters as shown 
in figure 1. 
 
In simulations, we aggregated the 78 regions into eight and 57 industries into 15. The regions in the 
simulations are Turkey, EU north (EUN) comprising Nordic countries, Baltic countries, Benelux 
countries, Poland, the UK and Ireland; EU south (EUS) comprising the rest of the EU except 
Germany and Austria that were assumed to form one unit; Balkan countries, NAFTA, Asia and the 






Our simulation results clearly confirm earlier findings that suggest clear benefits for Turkey and not 
significant impact on the other parts of the world. Figures 2 and 3 show the welfare effect measured 
by equivalent variation in million of USD and the output effect as a percentage of GDP. As an 
aggregate the rest of the world seems to gain welfare slightly especially in scale with entry scenario. 
This does not hold in standard benchmark scenario with perfect competition in which the EU   10
incumbent countries lose. Moreover, EU south loses under both imperfect competition scenarios. 
The output effect for the rest of the world can hardly be seen. 
 
Compared to earlier quantitative estimates our positive effect for Turkey is smaller in terms of 
output and welfare than most of the earlier studies. Our results are, however, very similar to those 
obtained in Francois (2005). He also considers dynamic effects, which is not done here. Their 
impact on welfare is roughly additional 50 per cent and they have various output effects, biggest 
being in agriculture. 
 
Let us next have a look on sectoral output effects shown in table A1 in appendix 1. The results 
assume scale economies. Again there are no significant effects on other regions and countries than 
Turkey. The sectors that gain output in Turkey are wood, electronics, manufactures and to some 
extent car and textile industries. The only sector that is shrinking is agriculture. Compared to 
Francois (2005) results ours are somewhat different as we obtain a positive output effect for car and 
metals industries. Moreover, in textiles the output effect in table A1 is much smaller than in 
Francois (2005). One obvious reason for this is the small scale parameter value in textiles. 
 
In sum, Turkish EU membership is clearly beneficial for Turkey and it does not seem to have 
significant negative impact for the rest of the world. If we take scale economies into account the 
aggregate effects are larger than in perfect competition case. Also, the industries having the highest 
scale parameters naturally gain more than those with lower scale parameters, which makes the some 
difference to the results that assume perfect competition. Still, lighter industries like electronics and 
light manufacturing, where Turkey has comparative advantage, are the winners of deeper EU 
integration. 
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Appendix 1. Regional welfare and output effects of Turkish EU accession 
 














317.94 (maximum) EV: Turkish accession to the EU in competitive model
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Table A1.   The effects of Turkish accession to the EU on output in different regions and sectors 
assuming scale economies 
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